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1989: Hungary and the changes in Eastern Europe 
by Csaba Békés 
 
Up until 1989, vitally no one had expected that the developments in Eastern Europe could 
lead to the total collapse of communism in the foreseeable future. The fate of this region was 
routinely subordinated to Western relations with Moscow, and the main consideration for 
Western politicians interested in the success of perestroika was ensuring the security interests 
of the Soviet Union, and they viewed the maintenance of the Eastern European status quo as 
its primary guarantee. Although on moral grounds they did support developments pointing 
toward a democratic transition in these countries and the opposition movements fighting for 
this course, maintaining stability at any cost was of primary importance. This position was not 
only motivated by concern about the potential Soviet reaction, but also by the worry that the 
total collapse of the Eastern European countries on the verge of economic bankruptcy might 
result in social explosions, ethnic conflicts, etc., which would have a negative influence on 
Western Europe as well. Such conflicts would endanger the process of integration, and more 
importantly, they would jeopardize the stability of the entire continent.  
 
In the spring of 1989, when President George H.W. Bush took office, a turn of historical 
importance was beginning to emerge in Eastern Europe. At the beginning of February, 
roundtable talks between the government and the now legally-acknowledged Solidarity 
movement began in Poland. By April they came to an agreement, and the first “semi-free” 
elections could be held in June, resulting in a sweeping victory for the opposition, which won 
most of the open seats.. In Hungary, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party accepted at its February 10-11 meeting the introduction of a multiparty 
system, and it also adopted the position that the 1956 events in Hungary constituted a popular 
uprising and not a counter-revolution.  
 
Assessing this from the American viewpoint, the most important factor was that these events, 
which would have seemed unbelievable even a year before, took place without any Soviet 
retribution, or even any sign of disapproval. In the spring of 1989, the Bush administration 
began to accustom itself to the idea that the old American dream originated by President 
Eisenhower was about to come true: the peaceful self-liberation of Eastern Europe under 
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Soviet approval. All that was needed for success was for the United States, and Western 
Europe in general, to give the Soviet Union – as far as it was possible – the opportunity for a 
dignified withdrawal from the region.
1
 In reality, in 1989–90 US policy vis-à-vis the transition 
was not just neutral, but time to time Washington explicitly urged leaders – especially those 
of Poland and Hungary – to be moderate and slow down the process of political transition. All 
this was meant to support Gorbachev’s reforms and his position in the Soviet Union by not 
exacerbating his situation in the Warsaw Pact states.   
 
At the December 1989 summit in Malta, Bush outlined the essence of his policy to Gorbachev 
in very clear terms:  
“I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have been going on, the 
United States has not engaged in condescending declarations aimed at damaging [the 
prestige of] the Soviet Union. There are people in the United States who accuse me of 
being too cautious. It is true, I am a prudent man, but I’m not a coward, and my 
Administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position in 
the world. But I was insistently advised to do something of that sort – to climb the 
Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations. My Administration, however is avoiding 
these steps, we are in favor of reserved behavior.”2  
 
Looking at the same issue from a non-superpower view, since the end of the 1970s Hungarian 
foreign policy had enjoyed a kind of special, relatively independent status. One important 
aspect of this special status was that it enabled Hungary to develop intensive economic and 
political relations with Western states precisely during those years when, due in part to the 
gradual alienation in the late 1970s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, East-West 
relations at the superpower level were at a low unprecedented since the early 1960s. 
 
Hungary’s increasing use of Western credit initially appeared advantageous to the Soviet 
Union as well, since it indirectly removed burdens from the Soviet economy while János 
                                                 
1
 On US policy concerning Eastern Europe, see: M.R. Beschloss, S. Talbott: At the Highest Levels, Boston, 
Little, Brown, 1993; Robert L. Hutchings: American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. An Insider’s 
Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989-1992, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London, 1997; George Bush, Brent Scowcroft: A World Transformed. 
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998; Tom Blanton: US policies and the revolutions of 1989. In: Tom Blanton, 
Svetlana Savranskaya, Vladimir Zubok (Eds.) Masterpieces of history. The peaceful end of the Cold War in 
Europe, 1989, Budapest–NewYork, CEU Press, 2010.  
2
 Soviet transcript of the Malta meeting, December 2 and 3, 1989. In: Ibid. 627. 
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Kádár himself guaranteed unquestionable political loyalty to Moscow. Thus in the beginning 
of the 1980s Hungary gradually became the number one favorite in the eyes of the West as the 
most presentable country of the Eastern bloc.  
 
After Gorbachev entered the scene, the situation changed in as much as the Soviet leadership 
took over the role as the primary promoter of dialogue between East and West. Nevertheless, 
a new turn in the Hungarian foreign policy – just as in the transition within the country – took 
place in 1988. This turn had nothing to do with the removal of Kádár or with the party 
conference in May, however, but rather with the significant positive changes taking place on 
the international political stage. This was the time when a new concept was being outlined 
which could possibly give Hungary the role as a bridge in East–West relations based on a new 
world order of cooperation. This was the context Hungary found itself in during the years of 
the transition of international politics.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed analysis see my study Back to Europe. The International Context of the Political Transition in 
Hungary, 1988–1990 In: Andras Bozóki [ed.], The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian 
Democracy. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2002. 237–272. 
 (http://www.rev.hu/portal/page/portal/rev/tanulmanyok/rendszervaltas/roundtable_bekes) on which this 
introduction is also based on. For an updated comprehensive history of the political transition in Hungary see: 
Csaba Békés–Melinda Kalmár: Political transition in Hungary and the end of the Cold War, 1988 – 1991. In: 
Mark Kramer (ed.) The Fate of Communist Regimes, 1989–1991. The Harvard Cold War Book Series. 
(forthcoming: 2015). 
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Hungary at the time of the Bush-Gorbachev meeting on Malta 
by Béla Révész 
 
1989 was a year of transformation. The collapse of communism shook not only the Eastern 
European countries but had a significant influence on world politics as a whole. While 
assessing the extremely rapid pace of historical events in Europe and in the wider world, it 
seems that less attention has been directed to the summit of the Presidents of the two world 
powers, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev which took place in December 1989. It has 
been said that this is due to a lack of proper information, and this is also the reason for the 
speculation about certain ‘secret agreements’ and false reports over ‘concealed protocols’ 
which have spread since then in increasing number. Others regard Malta simply as a social 
event, or a friendly meeting since participating parties indeed stressed the ‘unofficial’ 
character of the negotiations that took place on Saturday and Sunday, December 2 and 3. In 
his opening sentences Gorbachev even noted to his counterpart, “This meeting is perhaps a 
prelude to an official conference with you.” Yet, there are others who have regarded Malta as 
a final break with the so called Brezhnev Doctrine and the slogan ‘Yalta – Malta’ sounded 
good. Finally, there are opinions according to which Moscow simply got rid of its satellites, 
hurling its former allies to the West. 
 
Almost the only specific information heard at the joint press conference on Sunday noon was 
the instruction of the Presidents to their state secretaries as leaders of the arms limitation talks, 
in which the ministers were called upon to speed up the negotiations. It was decided that in 
June 1990 they would sign the strategic arms limitation START treaty. Reflecting upon a 
question regarding the Brezhnev Doctrine, Gorbachev replied that every country would 
independently decide on its own fate. “The changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” 
he stressed, “are results of historical changes, and the course of these changes has to be 
welcomed.” In this respect the headline of the next day’s Daily Telegraph has often been 
quoted: “The Cold War ended yesterday at 12:45 P.M.” But it was already suspected that the 
two Presidents were discussing more serious questions during their negotiations which lasted 
for some eight hours. It cannot be by accident that the American President flew immediately 
to Brussels from Malta, where he briefed the leaders of the NATO countries. Likewise, 
Gorbachev was also expected on the very next day to arrive in Moscow for a meeting with the 
representatives of the Warsaw Pact member countries. 
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Despite much vagueness, written sources published in the last two decades do document with 
increasing reliability the events at Malta. The total historical picture, however, which needs to 
be put together from many sources, is still fragmented. In relation to Hungary and the history 
of the Warsaw Pact leaders’ summit on 4 December, 1989, this e-Dossier contains some 
interesting documents which came to light from Rezső Nyers’ papers handed over to the 
Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Országos Levéltár) in 2005. Throughout the decades 
prior to 1989, Nyers’ name had been linked to the reform struggles within the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers Party (HSWP). In 1987 he was elected chair the Reform Committee of the 
Hungarian Parliament, and in 1988 became the member of the Politburo of the HSWP and a 
state minister. On top of that, in June 1989 he was elected as head of the HSWP and became a 
member of its newly set up four-member Political Executive Committee. When in October, 
1989 the HSWP declared its own dissolution and the birth of the Hungarian Socialist Party 
(HSP) was announced, he was elected as the head of the new party. It was in this latter role 
that he travelled to Moscow to participate at the summit of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact 
members states on 4 December, 1989, along with Prime Minister Miklós Németh and Under 
Secretary of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ferenc Somogyi. This e-Dossier 
features three accounts from the direct participants of the Moscow event: Nyers’s own 
handwritten account, his typed records for Prime Minister Németh, and Ferenc Somogyi’s 
written briefing for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Another source is Mátyás Szűrös’s contemporary letter which is worth noting in relation to 
the actual composition of the Hungarian delegation in Moscow. Szűrös, a long-standing party 
member was elected President of the Hungarian Parliament in March 1989. Since the country 
lacked a President, he became the provisional President of the republic when it was declared 
on 23 October, 1989. In those days he was a member of the HSP, the successor party of the 
HSWP. Dated 30 November, 1989, Szűrös sent a letter to Prime Minister Miklós Németh in 
which he complained about a ‘bad conciliation.’ In his letter, among others, he referred to not 
being sufficiently informed regarding the Warsaw Pact, because as the President he was 
supposed to be the supreme commander of the Army. He wrote that “it was not proper either 
that in the ‘diplomacys’ of the Warsaw Pact, the competencies of the Hungarian state and 
party are mixed up once again.” As an example he mentioned those who would be 
participating at the scheduled Moscow briefing in December 1989. Being less relevant to our 
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main topic, Mátyás Szűrös’s letter is not published here, but it is an interesting nuance that, 
according to the evidence, provisional President Szűrös would have liked to swap places with 
the HSP party chief Nyers in the delegation. 
 
In fact, in Moscow Miklós Németh’s preference was something else than participating at the 
Warsaw Pact leaders’ meeting. The WP conference offered the Hungarian Prime Minister a 
good opportunity to have bilateral discussions on the most urgent economic issues with his 
Soviet counterpart. During his negotiations with Nikolai Ryzhkov he reminded the Soviet side 
(not for the first time) that in the system of the Hungarian–Soviet economic cooperation a 
quick recovery of the balance of payment was needed. This was an urgent issue for him due to 
Hungary’s switch-over to the Dollar clearing system. This is why the Prime Minister focused 
on the economic issues during the press conference held after the Hungarian delegation 
returned home, while it was Nyers who summed up the events that happened at the meeting of 
the Warsaw Pact leaders. Nyers said that Gorbachev had informed the representatives of the 
WP countries about his trip to Italy, as well as about the topics raised at Malta, and the 
essence of their negotiations with President Bush. He also mentioned that since the Soviet 
Union had sent a note earlier to member states on its own position at Malta, the results of the 
summit can be compared with these earlier positions.
4
 The head of the HSP sensed that 
Gorbachev was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations as they facilitated the exchange 
of political views and endorsed learning how the other side thought. The continuity of 
dialogue was maintained and mutual contacts would continue in the future. The fact that 
Prime Minister Németh was mostly involved in economic negotiations while in Moscow 
explains why Nyers sent him a short written note on 6 December about Gorbachev’s briefing 
for the Warsaw Pact leaders.  
The press – not only in Hungary – did not find many interesting features in the information 
given by Gorbachev in Moscow. They much preferred Gorbachev and his wife’s four-day-
long visit to Italy prior to the meeting at Malta which resulted in signing of some 21 bilateral 
and inter-governmental treaties. The Gorbachevs’ visit to the Vatican was indeed a sort of a 
sensation. Especially popular was Pope John Paul’s promise that the Holy See would endorse 
the reform efforts of perestroika with its tools. Beyond this, however, what really drew the 
attention of the press after the December 4 meeting in Moscow was the news that the Warsaw 
                                                 
4
 Unfortunately, no document relating to this pre-Malta Soviet position has been found in Hungarian archives so 
far. 
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Pact member state representatives issued a joint declaration condemning their 1968 
Czechoslovakian intervention. As their communiqué stated: “The intervention of our armies 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an interference in the country’s inner policy which should be 
condemned. This unlawful act had broken the process of the democratic development in the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and had permanent negative consequences.” The Soviet 
government drafted a separate condemnation, in Hungary this had already happened in the 
middle of August. Romania, however, which in 1968 had not joined the action, did not 
participate among the signatories of the joint declaration. 
 
Many minutes, notes, official reports and documents with quite a high degree of accuracy are 
now available regarding the agenda of the negotiations at Malta. One important topic, 
however, was not mentioned at the time: the question of the European nuclear systems. 
Apparently it was not due to secretiveness, but this question was consciously avoided at the 
meeting by the presidents. According to a seemingly reliable account by Anatoly S. 
Chernyaev, an adviser to Gorbachev on foreign affairs, the word ‘atom’ was raised during the 
Malta meeting only in one single context, namely when President Bush mentioned it in 
relation of Lybia saying that chemical weapons made there ‘are the atomic bomb of the poor.’ 
Ignoring this topic is all the more apparent in that German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
was explicitly referring to this question on November 18, 1989 when he wrote a letter to 
President Bush over the situation in Eastern Europe and on the prospects of the Malta 
meeting:  
“On the NATO summit [on 29–30 May, 1989], which dealt with the control of the 
military forces and the general roadmap of disarmament, we took a clear position both 
on nuclear deterrence and the short range nuclear systems of the land forces. There we 
outlined an exact line for the negotiations regarding this matter. We must repeatedly 
signal to General Secretary Gorbachev that the existing great superiority of the East 
[Block] in this field should be unilaterally abolished, for later this decision would 
make negotiations easier.”5 
 
                                                 
5
 Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s letter to President George Bush on the situaton in Estern Europe and the prospects 
of the Malta meeting (November 28, 1989). Special collection of the German Federal Achives. Papers of the 
Office of the Federal Chancellor 212-30101 B 136/29806 Bd. 22. 
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In Eastern Europe, the absence of the nuclear question at Malta went unnoticed, for the matter 
of stationing nuclear warheads in the region was known only from certain unconfirmed 
rumors. Even the political leaders of the countries involved had barely any reliable 
information about this issue. Then what is the explanation that neither Western leaders nor 
Chancellor Kohl himself were forcing this question? Probably some intelligence reports came 
in with the news that, not long before the Malta meeting, nuclear warheads were transferred 
from Eastern Europe to Soviet bases. If this had been semi-official or leaked information, then 
President Bush would have surely signaled his positive attitude to the matter, at least in a 
short reference. The fact that neither President Bush raised this question nor was Chancellor 
Kohl’s demand passed on points to the ’talkative silence’ between the two presidents. The 
rather secretive nature of nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe gives the documents published 
in this e-Dossier an exciting historical context.  
 
The Eastern European ‘atom scandal’ broke at the beginning of the 1990s in the midst of 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the region. Some information became public that, in 
sharp contrast to the semi-official standpoint, the Soviet Army was stationing its nuclear 
arsenal not only in Czechoslovakia and the GDR but in Poland and Hungary too. “The Soviet 
troops stationed in Poland do not possess nuclear weaponry.” This was how the Polish 
government commissioner in charge of the Soviet troops’ withdrawal attempted to deny the 
news in April 1991.This was, however, disproved by Victor P. Dubynin, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces in Poland when he admitted: the Soviet Union 
had indeed stationed nuclear warheads in Poland up until mid-1990. In Eastern Europe, there 
were rocket units, and thus there were nuclear warheads too. But in the first half of 1990 they 
were all transferred back to the Soviet Union – as the general added. The news from Poland 
stirred up the Hungarian public, and voices demanding a clarification of the situation in 
Hungary strengthened. 
 
Some clear confirmation comes from Miklós Németh’s papers, in particular from some of his 
Russian language documents that were discovered recently. These papers – which are undated 
but with high probability were written in early December 1989 – confirm what had earlier 
been suspected by researchers: (i) the Soviet Union between 1969/1970 and 1989 was indeed 
stationing nuclear warheads on the territory of Hungary; (ii) the locality of that ‘independent 
maintenance-technical base’ where the nuclear gear was stationed was situated at the Upper 
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Balaton region, nearby Tótvázsony; (iii) the nuclear warheads were removed from this base 
between 22 and 24 November, 1989, i.e. indeed just a few days before the Presidents’ meeting 
at Malta. The relevant part of the original Russian-language memorandum that was handed 
over to Prime Minister Németh by the Soviet ambassador Boris I. Stukalin reads as follows 
below (in brackets you can find Miklós Németh’s own written remarks on the document, 
while abbreviation ‘IMTB’ stands for ‘independent maintenance-technical base’): 
 
3. About the nuclear warheads. In accordance with the intergovernmental agreement 
between the USSR and Hungary, in the years of 1969/1970 nuclear warheads were 
deployed at the independent maintenance-technical base [IMTB] [number] 1542 
(Tótvázsony – area of Lake Balaton) for the Hungarian Peoples’ Army and the 
Southern Group of Soviet Armed Forces. The same agreement had stated that all 
IMTB facilities and buildings as the property of Hungary would be put at the 
temporary disposal of the Soviet military units which are responsible for the 
completeness of these projects. In 1989 a decision was made on the removal of the 
nuclear warheads from the IMTB No 1542 to the territory of the USSR. Tasks related 
to the removal of the warheads were accomplished between November 24 and 26 of 
the current year. Presently, there are no nuclear warheads at the IMTB. (”1989: 
withdrawn (resolution!) withdrawn on Nov. 24-26! Presently there are no warheads 
there.” Note by Miklós Németh) Specifically as IMTB No 1542 is concerned, in case 
of an agreement with the Hungarian side it could be withdrawn from the territory of 
Hungary in the 1990s. (Handwritten note here by Miklós Németh:”Unit No 15-42 will 
be withdrawn in 1990. I agree.” 6 
 
The 1989 decision over transferring nuclear warheads back to the Soviet Union obviously 
affected not only Hungary but other bases with similar function in the Warsaw Pact countries 
too. Thus what chancellor Kohl had not known on November 28, 1989 that may have been 
shared with him a week later – perhaps by President Bush. Gorbachev, however, considered 
the conveyed nukes as such a confident matter that he did not intend to share it even with the 
members of the leading body of the Warsaw Pact. Mainly because these representatives of the 
WP countries were not at all those representatives he used to meet before, i.e. not the earlier 
                                                 
6
 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL), [Hungarian National Archive–State Archive], XIX-
A-2-at. Box 7. 
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faithful communist leadership was present in Moscow. For instance, in the Polish delegation, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki sat next to President Wojciech Jaruzelski; in fact, Mazowiecki as leader 
of the expert group of the Solidarity trade union movement had been interned for one year by 
General Jaruzelski during the state of emergency in Poland. Yet during the WP meeting in 
Moscow, there was one single reference to the nuclear warheads when at a certain point 
Gorbachev referred to the “Akhromeyev formula.” In the 19 April, 1989 issue of the Soviet 
Pravda, Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev, earlier the Soviet chief of the General Staff and later 
military adviser to Gorbachev, proposed a radical reduction of all sorts of theater nuclear 
weapons and consequently their total liquidation. By December 1989, however, political 
decisions went beyond earlier theoretical considerations.  
 
All things considered, reinforcement of goodwill took place at Malta. No formal agreements 
were born there, thus there was no decision ‘over the new partitioning of the world’ either. 
Nothing of the sort was even needed. The announcement about “the end of the Cold War” 
itself meant an indirect admission that the Soviet Union had lost it – although in reality, the 
Cold War ended only in 1991with the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union.  
 
[Translated by Barnabás Vajda and Karl P. Benziger] 
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Hungary and international politics in 1989 
A selected chronology
7
 
 
25 January: Ferenc Kárpáti, Minister of Defense, says one Soviet armored division and one 
training regiment will be withdrawn from Hungary in the first half of the year, and in the 
second half a vertical assault battalion and a fighter plane regiment will be removed. 
3 March: Vladimir Shemyatjenko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the European 
Economic Commission, says in his interview given to the paper Le Soir in Brussels: the 
Soviet measures taken in 1956 and 1968 rested on legal grounds. He expresses his hopes, 
however, that such events and situations will not occur in the future again. 
5 March: Foreign minister Péter Várkonyi conducts negotiations separately with Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevarnadze and American Secretary of State James Baker. 
5 June: Foreign Minister Gyula Horn states nothing can justify the bloodshed in Beijing. 
Many political and social organizations condemn the bloodshed in Beijing in a communiqué 
and warns that political conflicts should not be settled by force of arms in Hungary. There are 
demonstrations in front of the Chinese embassy in Budapest. 
29 June: Jevgenyiy Ambarutsev publishes an essay on the occasion of the Imre Nagy funeral 
in Moskovskie Novosty. In it  he stresses: “Though Imre Nagy was convicted by a Hungarian 
court in Budapest, it is unquestionably our sin, the sin of our leader at that time, Khrushchev."  
                                                 
7
 This chronology is an excerpt from the following publication: Political Transition in Hungary, 1987-1990. 
Chronology of Events Compiled by Tibor BECK, Edited by Csaba BÉKÉS and Miklós VÖRÖS. Contributions 
to the chronology were made by Sándor HORVÁTH, Pál GERMUSKA, Balázs MAJTÉNYI, Karola VÁGYI 
mrs NÉMETH, István SIMON, Eszter Zsófia TÓTH, © National Security Archive, Washington DC Cold War 
History Research Center, Budapest, 1956 Institute, Budapest, 1999. The complete chronology is available at: 
www.coldwar.hu  
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11 July: George H.W. Bush, President of the United States of America arrives in Budapest. In 
the course of the day 4 Hungarian-American joint venture company contracts are signed. 
12 July: George H.W. Bush makes a promise in Budapest that he will urge for effective 
economic help for Hungary at international forums, in the first place at the upcoming summit 
meeting in Paris. The US president suggests that the Congress should establish a $25 million 
fund to support the acceleration of private business in Hungary, and furthermore, in case the 
Hungarian Parliament passes the bill on emigration, trade restrictions on Hungary should be 
lifted.  
25 July: In Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev, Rezső Nyers and Károly Grósz agree to continue 
negotiations on the further withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. They also agree 
that under appropriate international circumstances the reduction of troops may lead to a 
complete withdrawal of armed forces. 
10 September: The Council of Ministers announces that as of midnight on September 11, 
East German citizens are allowed to leave Hungary for Western countries as well. The next 
three days over 12 thousand people take the best of this opportunity.  
26 October: US President George H.W. Bush signs the decision on the basis of which 
Hungary is granted the status of a most favored nation for a longer period of time. 
27 October: Gyula Horn announces at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization in Warsaw that Hungary will make even more efforts in the future to 
follow its own course of foreign policy independent of its membership in the organization. 
11 November: The Italian, Yugoslav, Austrian and Hungarian foreign ministers negotiate in 
Budapest on the possibility of more intensive cooperation in the Alps-Adriatic-Danube 
region. 
29 November: Prime Minister Miklós Németh assures the defense ministers of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization in Budapest that Hungary will continue to be a member of the Eastern 
European military alliance, but he also stresses that the alliance needs to be modernized. 
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2-3 December: President George H.W. Bush and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev meet aboard a ship on the shores of Malta. 
3-4 December: President H.W. Bush briefs NATO Heads of State and Governments on the 
US–Soviet summit. Among others, he meets Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Laeken, near 
Brussels. During the talks the Chancellor has an impression, as he states in his diary, that a 
“turning point had taken place” in the US policy regarding the German reunification.  
4 December: The Hungarian State Secretary of the Ministry of Finance says, in the presence 
of members of the Parliament, that the reserves of the country have reached a minimum which 
would result in declaring insolvency of the country if the Parliament fails to pass the act on 
the budget. The International Monetary Fund expects Hungary to radically reduce its deficit in 
the balance of trade in 1990, otherwise it will not grant further credits to the country. 
21 December: The Parliament pronounces its dissolution effective of 16 January, 1990. The 
representatives pass the 1990 budget act. On the same day defense minister Ferenc Kárpáti 
announces further withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
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Introduction to the documents 
by Barnabás Vajda 
 
The following brief collection of primary sources, that are published here for the first time, 
shed light on the reactions of the top Hungarian political leaders right after the summit of 
President George H.W. Bush and Chairman M. Gorbachev off the shores of Malta, on 
December 2-3, 1989.  
 
In the first part of this e-Dossier, readers will find two letters by Rezső Nyers, then President 
of the Hungarian Socialist Party. First, the unofficial hand-written notes he took during a 
briefing by M. Gorbachev at a Soviet Bloc summit in Moscow on 4 December, just a day after 
the meeting with President Bush. The second document by Nyers is an official report he 
compiled about the Malta meeting some time later, on 6 December, in order to inform Prime 
Minister Miklós Németh. For the sake of clarity, we publish Rezső Nyers’s manuscript in 
three versions: as an original scan (Document I/1-A), as a line-to-line full document 
Hungarian transcription (Document I/1-B), and as an edited English translation text 
(Document I/1-C). 
 
The second part of our collection consists of two more documents, both originating from the 
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no doubt that both documents: a report 
written by Deputy Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi about the meeting of the leaders of the 
Warsaw Pact, as well as a telegram sent by the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about V.M. 
Falin’s briefing about the Malta meeting provide valuable and almost immediate reactions 
inside Hungarian diplomatic circles as a consequence of the overwhelming influence of the 
Malta meeting. 
 
All documents published here have been translated into English, and to our best knowledge 
none of them have been previously published. 
 
Our contribution, entitled “The Malta Summit of 1989 from Hungarian Perspective: Related 
Sources after 25 Years” should certainly be considered in the wider context of international 
research that has been done so far regarding East European transitions in 1989 in general, and 
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the Malta meeting in particular. There were several publications that served as inspirations for 
us:  
 
Anatolij Chernaev’s notes on the Malta meeting were first published in parts in 
English in The End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989: New Thinking and New Evidence. A 
Compendium of Declassified Documents Prepared for a Critical Oral History Conference 
organized by the National Security Archive, Washington D.C., Musgrove, Georgia, (USA) 
May 1–3, 1998. 
A longer but still not full version was published in the Cold War International History 
Project Bulletin no. 12-13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 229-241. 
 The document was finally published in toto in Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful 
End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas S. Blanton, and 
V. M. Zubok (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010).   
The American records of the meeting were made available in Joshua R. Itzkowitz 
Shifrinzon, The Malta Summit and US–Soviet Relations: Testing the Waters Amidst Stormy 
Seas. New Insights from American Archives, Cold War International History Project e-Dossier 
No. 40. (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-malta-summit-and-us-soviet-relations-
testing-the-waters-amidst-stormy-seas) 
 
We decided to publish this brief but original collection of documents because no report on this 
important Warsaw Pact meeting has been published to date.  
No document on Gorbachev’s briefing on the Malta summit was included in the recent 
excellent volume publishing many international documents on the transition in the Soviet 
Bloc as well, c.f. Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 
1989, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas S. Blanton, and V. M. Zubok (Budapest: Central 
European University Press, 2010). 
Nor had they been included in publications concerning earlier international research 
programs by the National Security Archive in Washington DC.  
Similarly, they had not been included in major international online publication projects 
like the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) Publication Series. 
(Washington D.C./Zurich.) See especially the records of the Party leaders (WP Political 
Consultative Committee). http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/publications/php_collseries.cfm. 
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We also understand that there has been a very significant output of primary sources in 
the Hungarian language, all partially concerning the times preceding and/or around December 
1989. Just to name the most important of them is the fundamental collections of documents:  
Rendszerváltozás Magyarországon 1989–1990. Dokumentumok. [Political Transition 
in Hungary, 1989–1990]. Békés Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, Kalmár Melinda, Ripp 
Zoltán, Vörös Miklós, (Eds.).National Security Archive, Hidegháború-történeti 
Kutatóközpont, 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1999;Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar 
vezetőkkel. Dokumentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archívumaiból 1985–1991 
(Eds. János Rainer M. and Magdolna Baráth. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2000).  
Sub Clausula 1989. Dokumentumok a politikai rendszerváltozás történetéhez 
[Documents on the history of the political transition], Gábor Máthé (et al. Eds.) 
Magyar Közlöny, Budapest, 2009. 
A Páneurópai Piknik és határáttörés húsz év távlatából [The Pan-European picnic and 
the penetration of the border – Twenty years later, György Gyarmati (Ed.), L’ 
Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2010, including contributions by Sándor Szakály, Ignác 
Romsics, László Borhi, Krisztina Slachta, András Oplatka, Imre Tóth, György 
Gyarmati, Ernő Deák, and Gert Tschögl.  
The above mentioned sources, however, are all in Hungarian, thus not accessible for 
most researchers abroad. The documents in this e-Dossier were also not yet available for other 
major publications of translated documents, such as: 
 Political Transition in Hungary, 1989–1990. Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Melinda 
Kalmár, Zoltán Ripp, and Miklós Vörös (Eds.). Documents compiled by Magda 
Baráth, Csaba Békés, Melinda Kalmár, Gusztáv Kecskés, Zoltán Ripp, Béla Révész, 
Éva Standeisky, Miklós Vörös. National Security Archive, Cold War History Research 
Center, 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1999.  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/political-transition-hungary-1989-1990) 
 
As both the Soviet and American minutes of the Malta meeting are now available, the 
documents published in this e-Dossier shed new light mostly on the Eastern perception of the 
event, i.e. how Gorbachev presented and interpreted his talks with Bush to the Soviet Bloc 
leaders. Besides discussing the summit he gave a detailed report on his recent visit to Italy and 
the Vatican that was “a success beyond all expectations” and evaluated the prospects of 
improving bilateral relations very highly: they agreed on establishing diplomatic relations 
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between the Soviet Union and the Vatican, moreover, the Pope was invited to Moscow and 
accepted the invitation. In addition, the documents also reveal how these negotiations were 
seen in one of the leading reformer states of the Soviet Bloc in the midst of the transition from 
Communist rule to democracy. 
 
 
[The documents published in this CWIHP e-Dossier have been compiled and published by 
Béla Révész, Csaba Békés and Barnabás Vajda, and they were translated by Karl P. 
Benziger, Laura Deal and Barnabás Vajda.] 
I/1-A.  
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I/1-B. Rezső Nyers’s handwritten notes on Gorbachev’s briefing on the 
Malta summit at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders in Moscow on 
December 4, 1989  
 
Line-to-Line Full-Text Hungarian Transcription 
 
Source: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL), [Hungarian National 
Archive–State Archive], „A Varsói Szerződés párt- és állami vezetők tanácskozása 
Moszkvában 1989. december. 4. Nyers Rezső iratai. Kéziratos jegyzet. MNL OL M-KS 288. 
f. 66. d. 28. ő. e.” 
 
Physical extent: 9 pieces of A/4 folio, according to the MOL’s numbering pp. 393-401. 
 
 
 
Varsói Szerződés párt és állami vezetőinek 
tanácskozása 
Moszkva, 1989. december 4. 
 
[1. (MOL számozása szerint: 393.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Nagyon jelentős időszak – Új szakasz 
Folytassuk együttműködésünket  
Más, érdemibb kontaktusokat fenntartani  
Országaink megerősödését szolgálja 
Nagy felelősség hárul ránk 
Viharos időket élünk 
Megőrizni higgadtságunkat  
Előrelátni, helyesen a változások irányát 
Hiteles információkat adjunk-kapjunk  
Ne legyen félreértés köztünk  
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Ne késsünk le az események mögött 
Élénkebbé, nyitottabbá váljon az együttműkö-  
désünk  
Tervezni kell egy eszmecserét országaink  
helyzetéről 
 
Olaszországi látogatásról beszámoló 
Olaszország érdekelt a gazdasági-politikai kap- 
csolatokról [sic!] 
Elsőnek jelentek meg a szovjet piacon, most is  
erősen törekednek  
 
[2. (394.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Látogatás tapasztalatai nagyon jók 
Az olasz nép üdvözli, a kormány is akarja  
a jó kapcsolatokat 
Árnyalatnyi eltérések vannak (katonai  
elkötelezettség különbözősége) 
A helsinki folyamat új szakaszára van szükség. 
(Helsinki II.) 
Olaszok aktív résztvevők akarnak lenni 
20 egyezmény aláírása – Közös kutatások 
Leszerelés gazdasági hatásai 
Narkománia elleni harc 
Környezeti veszedelmek 
Gazdasági együttműködés iránt közösen 
nagy egyetértés 
Olaszok támogatják 1990-ben az európai  
államok vezetőnek részvételével 
Földközi tengeri - Fekete tengeri országok  
együttműködését szorgalmazzák 
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Andreotti: 
Közel-keleti (különösen Libanon) 
kérdését igen aktívan vetették fel 
 
II. János–Pál [ sic! ] pápával való találkozó 
Tartalmas volt a találkozó 
Európai és Világhelyzetről is szó volt 
Pápa tézisei hasonlók a mieinkről 
 
[3. (395.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: Óriási erő ez, mert 700 millió hívő katolikus 
Pápa támogatja a Peresztrojkát 
Nem támogatja sehol a destabilizációt 
?? 
Kapcsolatokat (diplomáciai) visszaállítják! 
Pápát meghívták! Elfogadta! 
Időt megválasztani jól, nem erőltetve 
SzU-beli katolikusok dolgát felvetette a Pápa 
Szovjet részről: minden egyházzal jó viszony 
Ha megegyeznek a pravoszláv egyházzal, 
a SzU nem akadályozza 
Nem szabad ebből politikai kérdést 
csinálni! 
Politika és Erkölcs harmonizálása: 
Felvállalni az általános emberi értékeket! 
 
Bush elnökkel való találkozás 
Kezdeményezés az USA elnökétől eredt! 
Igazolást kellett kapni: az USA részéről adott a  
folyamatosság! 
Bush kezdetben lelassító taktikai magatartást  
tanúsított a SzU felé, majd európai [sic!] 
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Két találkozó küldöttséggel, két találkozó 
négyszemközt! 8 óra tiszta idő 
Időjárás: Hadihajóról polgári hajóra 
Nyugodt, jó légkör, vádaskodás nélkül, közben  
az éles kérdéseket nem kerülték meg 
Reagen stílusától eltért! 
Nem volt semmi kioktató jellege 
[4. (396.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Kezdet (Bush): 
1) Gazdasági kérdésekkel kezdte 
Szinte csak búzakereskedelem az utóbbi 
években! 
Előrehaladás jelei 
- Jackson–Vanik klauzula feloldását  
elfogadják 
- Nem ellenzik már a nemzetközi szer- 
vezetekben való szovjet részvételt 
 
2) Katonai politikai kérdések 
Konstruktív 
- Stratégiai fegyverzetek 
Júniusra 50%-os csökkentés kidolgoz- 
ható! 
Hamarosan aláírható! 
USA javaslat: 
SzU 6,5 ezer rakéta 
USA 8,0 “ ” 
- Tengeri flottánál megsemmisíteni a 
nukleáris fegyvereket 
(taktikai, szárnyasrakétákkal együtte- 
sen: SzU álláspont) 
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- Hagyományos fegyverzet terén 
1990-ben aláírni (Helsinki II.) 
Gorbacsov: 
Nemcsak fegyverzetet, hanem a lét- 
számot is csökkenteni! 
Nem adott választ az USA 
Azonos szintre csökkentés (300 ezer fő) 
USA és SzU szinten? Ez nem jó 
Nyugat-Eur. (Anglia, Franciaor. stb.) kimaradna  
 
[5. (397.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Haditengerészeti rendezés elakadt - Nyitva 
SzU körülvéve USA támaszpontokkal! 
- Vegyifegyver-kérdés 
Terv a VF 80%-ának felszámolásáról, ha  
USA elhagyná a „bináris fegyverek” fej- 
lesztését 
VF-ek 2%-ához ragaszkodnak az USA 
részéről! Ez nem globális megszüntetés 
 
SzU kész megjelenni az ottawai konf.-n: 
nyitott égbolt konf.-n  
Kiszélesíteni: tenger stb.) 
Külügymin. szintjén foglalkozni vele 
intenzíven! 
 
Megállapodás: 1990. június 2. felében megtar- 
tani a következő csúcsot! 
 
3) Közép-Amerikai kérdés 
Nicaragua (Több párt, mint az USA-ban) 
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Kuba fegyverrel segíti a forr. exportját 
Nagy az USA bizalmatlansága ezzel a két  
országgal szemben 
Gorbacsov: Nic. nem vesz részt a repülő (fegyver)  
szállításban S. Salvadorban (sic!) 
Bush: USA résztvesz  
 
4) Ökológiai probléma 
Bush: Sok probléma, számos ok az aggodalomra  
Fehér Házban lesz terv 
 
[6. (398.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
5) Európai helyzet: 
Rákényszerítették Bush-t a véleményére 
az emberek. 
Szovjet felvetés: 
- Háború utáni időszak a béke megóvása 
de nagy ára van ennek! 
Fegyverkezés nem vált be! 
Konfrontációs politika vereséget szenvedett Európában! 
USA-ban vannak, akik szerint a hidegháborús politika bevált! 
Európa egyesítése a nyugati értékrend alapján?  
Bush elgondolása,  
de szovjet éles ellenvélemény Gorbacsov figyelmeztetése Bush-nak:  
El akarja pusztítani a Szu.-t?  
Európai Egyesült Államok? 
Helsinki folyamat mellett közösen 
hitet tettek! 
 
Egyetértés: 
Katonai tömböket politikai kérdé- 
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sekre orientálni! 
 
NDK kérdése: 
Gorbacsov:  határok sérthetetlenek 
Két német állam 
USA: Egyetért, számol a német érzelmekkel,  
de nem szabad erőltetni 
 
[7. (399.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Konföderáció ellen! Megbontja a tömböket! 
(Közös külügy, hadügy, pénzügy) 
Kohl választási célból dobta be a gondolatot! 
VSz a védelmi doktrínát támogatja ezután is! 
NATO eddigi stratégia: 
5. napon ellentámadás nukleáris  
eszközökkel! 
Ez igazában nem védelmi doktrína  
 
Fülöp szigeteki puccsról vitáztak. 
 
Regionális konfliktusok 
1) Afganisztán! SzU közös erőfeszítést  
sürgetett 
Bush: Elveszítették az érdeklődésüket 
Nadzsibullah rendszer kérdésében  
tévedett 
SzU: Koalíciós kormány érdekében 
nemzetközi (közös) konferenciát 
Szabad választásokat 
2) Közel-kelet 
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Konstruktívnak értékelték a SzU sze- 
repét! 
USA szerepe is konstruktív  
Arafaté is! 
Izraellel nehézségek vannak (Bush  
panaszkodott) 
Andreotti:  
Mindkét részről sok ajándék Iz- 
raelnek! Követelni érte ellen- 
szolgáltatást! 
 
Bush érdeklődött a SzU átalakítasa iránt 
 
[8. (400.) oldal]  
 
Gorbacsov: 
Bush ajánlotta a magántulajdont!  
Gorbacsov ezt vitatta! 
Fontos: a termelőnek legyen önállósága! 
 
Összességében: 
Nagyobb megértés az USA részéről Kelet- 
Európa iránt! 
 
Bush érdeklődött a Baltikumi kérdések rendezése  
iránt! 
Azt kérte, hogy békésen rendezzék! 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Egységes szabványokkal dolgozni a Karabah-  
terület, a Baltikum, Ulster és Quebec  
kérdésében! 
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A tanácskozáson résztvettek: 
Szovjetúnió részéről:  
Gorbacsov, Rizskov, Jakovlev, Sevardnadze  
Csehszlovákia: 
Urbanek, Adamec, ?? 
Magyarország: 
 Nyers, Németh M., Somogyi F. 
NDK:  
Mudrow, Krenz, ?? 
Lengyel: Jaruzelski, Mazoviecki, Rakovski  
Román: Ceausescu, Dascalescu, ?? 
Bulgária: Mladenov, Miniszterelnök, ?? 
 
Felszólaltak: Mladenov, Nyers, Mudrow, Jaruzelski, Ceausescu,  
Urbanek 
 
[9.(401.) oldal] 
 
Gorbacsov: 
Koncepciónk felelősségteljes 
Tömböket fel kell számolni, de nem egyoldalúan 
Nyugatról is ezt tanácsolják 
Lépésről lépésre tovább! 
Január 9-re meghívni! 
Két német állam szerződéses kapcsolatot létesítsen! 
Két állam – nem konfederáció – 
Erősödő együttműködés 
Csehszlovákiai beavatkozás (1968-as) elítélése 
 
A tanácskozás végén: 
Közös nyilatkozat az 1968-as  
csehszlovákiai beavatkozás  
hibás voltáról! 
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I/1-C. Rezső Nyers’s handwritten notes on the Bush-Gorbachev meeting on 
Malta from December 4, 1989  
 
Edited Full-Text English Transcription 
 
Conference of the Party and State leaders of the Warsaw Treaty  
Moscow, December 4, 1989 
 
Gorbachev: [It’s a] Very important period – New era. Let’s continue our cooperation. To keep 
up other, meritorious contacts. [It] Serves to strengthen our countries. Great responsibility 
falls on us. We live in stormy times. We should keep our soberness. We should foresee rightly 
the direction of change. We should give and obtain trustworthy information. Let there be no 
misunderstandings among us. Let’s not fall behind events. Let our cooperation become more 
lively and more open. An exchange of views must be planned on the situation of our 
countries. 
 
[Gorbachev’s] Report on the visit in Italy. Italy is interested in economic-political relations. 
They [the Italians] have appeared first on the Soviet market, [and they] strongly intend to stay 
now too. Gorbachev: The visit [to Italy] was very good. Good relations are welcomed by the 
Italian people, [and] the government wants it too. There are slight differences (differences of 
military engagements). A new phase of the Helsinki process is needed (Helsinki II). The 
Italians want to be active participants. 
Signing of 20 agreements – Joint research [projects]. Economic effects of disarmament. Fight 
against narcomania [i.e. drug addiction]. Environmental perils. Strong mutual agreement 
toward economic cooperation. The Italians support [the convening of a conference] with the 
participation of leaders of European states in 1990… [unfinished sentence] They [the Italians] 
press for the cooperation of Mediterranean – Black See countries. [Giulio] Andreotti: Raised 
the question of the Middle East (especially of Lebanon) very actively. 
 
[Gorbachev:] Meeting with Pope John–Paul II. (sic!) The meeting was substantive. There was 
some talk of the European and World situation too. The Pope’s views are similar to ours. 
Gorbachev: This is a huge power, for [there are] 700 million Catholic believers. The Pope 
supports perestroika. He does not support destabilization. Diplomatic relations will be 
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reestablished! The Pope was invited! He accepted it! The time [of the meeting with the Pope] 
should be well chosen, [but] not forcefully.
8
 The Pope raised the issue of Catholics in the 
USSR. From the Soviet side: good relations with all churches. If [the Vatican] makes an 
agreement with the Eastern Orthodox Church, [then] the USSR will not hinder it. We must 
not make a political question out of this! Harmonizing Politics and Ethics: Let’s support 
general human values! 
 
Meeting with President Bush. The initiative arose from the President of the USA. [For 
Gorbachev] It was important to get a confirmation [that] the USA wants continuity! 
At the beginning, Bush followed slowing down behavior and tactics toward the USSR, then 
European… [unfinished sentence]. Two meetings with delegation, two meetings one-on-one. 
8 hours net time. Weather: From a battleship to a civilian ship. Calm, good atmosphere, 
without accusations, meanwhile they [the participants] did not avoid sharp questions. It 
differed from Reagan’s style! It did not have an instructive character.  
 
Gorbachev: Beginning (Bush):  
 
1) He began with economic questions. [There was] Mostly only grain trade in recent years! 
Signs of progress. They accepted the lifting of the Jackson–Vanik clause. They don’t oppose 
any more Soviet participation in international organizations. 
 
2) Military political questions. Constructive. - Strategic arms. A 50% reduction can be worked 
out by June! Can be signed soon! USA proposition: USSR 6,5 thousand missiles. USA 8,0 
[thousand missiles]. To destroy the nuclear weapons at the naval fleet, (along with tactical 
cruise missiles: USSR position). On the issue of conventional weaponry. In 1990 to sign 
(Helsinki II.). Gorbachev: To reduce not only weaponry, but the amount of [military] 
personnel too! The USA did not give a reply. Reduction to the identical level (300 thousand 
men). USA and USSR on [the same] level? This is not good. West Eur.[ope] (England, 
France, etc.) would be left out.  
 
                                                 
8
 Eventually no such visit took place until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991 and Pope John 
Paul II never visited Moscow. 
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Gorbachev: Naval forces settlement is stuck – [This question is still] Open. USSR is 
surrounded by USA [military] bases! - Question of Chemical Weapons [CW]. Plan about 80% 
liquidation of CWs, if the USA stopped developing “binary weapons.” From the USA side, 
they stick to 2% of CWs! This is not abolition on a global scale. USSR ready to attend the 
Ottawa conf.[erence]: on Open Sky conf. Let’s make it wider: sea, etc.) To deal with it 
intensively at the level of the Foreign Min.[isters]! Agreement: To keep the next summit in 
the 2nd half of June 1990! 
 
3) Central America question: Nicaragua. ([There are] More parties [there] than in the USA.) 
Cuba helps the export of rev.[olution] with weapons. Much distrust by the USA toward these 
two countries. Gorbachev: Nic.[aragua] is not involved in the transport of airplanes 
(weapons) to S. [El] Salvador. Bush: USA does participate. 
 
4) Ecological problem: Bush: [There are] Many problems, numerous reasons to worry – there 
will be a White House plan [unfinished sentence]. 
 
Gorbachev: 5) European situation: Bush was forced by the opinion of the people. The Soviets 
raised: - The post-war period [has been about] the protection of peace, but it has had a big 
price! Arming did not work! [The strategy of] Confrontational policy has suffered a defeat in 
Europe! In the USA there are those who think the Cold War policy has worked! Unification 
of Europe based on western values? [It was] Bush’s idea, but [there was] sharp Soviet 
counter-opinion. Gorbachev’s warning to Bush: Does he want to destroy the USSR? United 
States of Europe? Both declared support for the Helsinki process! Agreement: To orient 
military blocks on political questions!  
 
[On the] Question of the GDR [German Democratic Republic]: (Gorbachev: borders are 
inviolable. Two German states. The USA: Agrees, takes German sentiments into account, but 
it must not be forced. 
Gorbachev: Opposes [a German] confederation! It would disrupt the blocks! (Joint foreign 
policy, defense, finance.) The idea was thrown in by Kohl for election purposes! 
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The WT [Warsaw Treaty] supports the defense doctrine from now on too! [The] NATO’s 
strategy [has been] so far: On the 5th day counterattack with nuclear weapons! In reality this 
is not a defense doctrine. 
They debated about the coup in the Philippines.  
 
Regional conflicts:  
1) Afghanistan! USSR urges mutual efforts. Bush: Lost their interest. Was wrong about 
Najibullah’s regime. USSR: (Joint) international conference in favor of a coalition 
government. 
Free elections. 
 
2) Middle East: They rated the role of the USSR as constructive. USA’s role is constructive 
too. [Yasser] Arafat’s too! There are difficulties with Israel. (Bush was complaining.) [Giulio] 
Andreotti: Both sides have given many gifts to Israel! To demand compensation for them! 
 
Bush was interested in the transformation of the USSR. Gorbachev: Bush recommended 
private ownership! Gorbachev disputed this! Important: let the producing units [i.e. factories] 
have independence! 
 
In total: Greater understanding toward Eastern Europe from the side of the USA! Bush was 
interested in the settlement of the Baltic question! He asked for a peaceful settlement! 
Gorbachev: We should work with uniform rules regarding the question of the Karabah region, 
the Baltics, Ulster, and Quebec! 
 
Gorbachev: Our conceptions are responsible. Blocks have to be eliminated, but not 
unilaterally. This has been recommended by the West too. Step by step further! Invite [him] 
for January 9! The two German states should establish a contractual relationship!  
Two [German] states – not a confederation. – Cooperation gaining strength. 
Condemnation of Czechoslovakian intervention (1968). 
At the end of the conference: Joint declaration on the wrongfulness of the 1968 
Czechoslovakian intervention! 
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Participated at the conference
9
: 
On the part of Soviet Union: [Mikhail Sergeyevich] Gorbachev, [Nikolai Ivanovich] Ryzhkov, 
[Alexsander Nikolaevich] Jakovlev [Yakovlev], [Eduard] Sevardnadze [Shevardnadze] 
Czechoslovakai: [Karel] Urbanek [Urbánek], [Ladislav] Adamec, ?? [two question marks in 
the original manuscript] 
Hungary: Nyers [Rezső], Németh M.[iklós], Somogyi F.[erenc] 
DDR: [Hans] Mudrow [Modrow], [Egon] Krenz, ?? [two question marks in the original 
manuscript] 
Polish: [Wojciech] Jaruzelski, [Tadeusz] Mazoviecki [Mazowiecki], [Mieczyslav] Rakovski 
[Rakowski] 
Roman[ian]: [Nicolae] Ceausescu, [Constantine] Dascalescu, ?? [two question marks in the 
original manuscript] 
Bulgaria: [Petar Toshev] Mladenov, Prime Minister ?? [two question marks in the original 
manuscript] 
Rose to speak: Mladenov, Nyers, Mudrow, Jaruzelski, Ceausescu, Urbanek 
 
 
(Obtained by Béla Révész. Transcribed by Renáta Marosi. English translation by Barnabás 
Vajda and Laura Deal. Edited by Barnabás Vajda) 
 
 
 
 
I/2. Rezső Nyers’s typed notes to Miklós Németh on Gorbachev’s briefing 
about the Malta meeting from December 6, 1989  
 
Edited Full-Text English Transcription 
 
Source: Feljegyzés a Minisztertanácsnak a Varsói Szerződés tagállamai vezetőinek 
tanácskozásáról. 1989. december 6. Nyers Rezső az MSZP elnöke. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár 
                                                 
9
 In the original handwritten notes the list of participant appears not as the final section, so in the translation it 
was rearranged by the editors.  
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Országos Levéltára, MNL OL Németh Miklós Minisztertanács (MT) elnöke iratai, XIX-A-2-
at. 2. d. Records for Miklós Németh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the conference 
of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. December 6, 1989. Written by Rezső 
Nyers, President of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). Hungarian National Archive 
(Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára) Hungarian National Archive–State Archive, 
MNL OL: Files of Miklós Németh, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (MT), XIX-A-2-at. 
2. d. 
 
At the unofficial conference of the Warsaw Treaty [country leaders] on December 4 [1989], 
participants from the Soviet side were Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary General of the CPSU, 
USSR; Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Nikolai [Ivanovich] Ryzhkov, 
Prime Minister; and [Alexsander Nikolaevich] Yakovlev, Chief Adviser to Gorbachev. 
Hungary was represented by Prime Minister Miklós Németh, Minister of State Rezső Nyers, 
and Ferenc Somogyi, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
At the opening of the conference Gorbachev said: the course of the changes must be foreseen, 
thus the [socialist] countries should give each other real information. There should be a 
conference organized between the socialist countries to help the exchange of views. After this, 
he touched upon his negotiations in Italy, and said: with his [Italian] counterparts they agreed 
that there should be another Helsinki agreement. On his meeting with the Pope he said: “In 
relation to the world situation, the Pope’s theses are similar to ours, the Holy Father supports 
the perestroika, and does not support destabilization. We invited the Pope to Moscow.” 
 
Talking about the meeting in Malta he said that the initiative came from President [George] 
Bush who wanted to justify that on the side of the USA there is a demand for upholding the 
continuous relations. He [Gorbachev] considered it important to stress that the atmosphere of 
the talks was calm, good, and without accusations. Bush’s tone, in contrast to [Ronald] 
Reagan’s [style], was not patronizing. On the European situation, Gorbachev expressed that 
after the second World War peace became consolidated in the region [of Europe] but it had a 
big price: the arms race. Gorbachev drew a conclusion that the confrontational-style policy 
suffered a defeat in Europe, and blamed Bush for certain circles in the USA that still assert 
that same Cold War policy should be continued. According to Gorbachev, “we forced Bush to 
express his opinion; we asked him some questions. He should tell us what he wants: Does he 
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want to destroy the USSR? Does he want United States of Europe?” Bush replied that he 
conceives of the unification of Europe on the basis of Western values. Unlike him, Gorbachev 
argued for the model of the European House, [and] the peaceful coexistence of the two 
systems. Gorbachev said that at the end both of them declared support for the Helsinki 
process. 
 
According to the information of the Soviet Secretary General, on Malta he stood up firmly for 
the existence of two German states; Bush also agreed with the inviolability of [state] borders, 
adding that German sentiments have to be considered, but nothing should be forced. 
Gorbachev explained to Bush that he is against the confederative solution. In his opinion, 
Chancellor [Helmut] Kohl has thrown the question of German unification to public opinion 
just as an election trick. Gorbachev proposed to Bush that the two German states should set up 
a contractual relationship, and the military blocks should be abolished. 
 
Gorbachev said that Bush recommended to him the appearance of private ownership in the 
USSR, but he is against it. In his opinion the main point is that the workers should have 
adequate [economic] independence. 
 
Beyond that, the Soviet Secretary General informed those present about the military limitation 
[talks], about the situation in Central America and the Middle East, about the regional 
conflicts, and about the negotiations over some ecological issues. 
 
December 6, 1989 
 
[Written by] Rezső Nyers, President [of the Hungarian Socialist Party]  
 
(Obtained by Béla Révész. Transcribed by Renáta Marosi. English translation by Barnabás 
Vajda and Laura Deal. Edited by Barnabás Vajda) 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
II/1. Report of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [F. Somogyi] for 
the Council of Ministers about the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw 
Pact from December 6, 1989  
 
Edited Full-Text English Transcription 
 
Author of the source: the document is not signed; with high probability the document was 
authorized by Ferenc Somogyi, Under Secretary of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who was present at the meeting in Moscow 
 
Original physical extent of the source: 9 pages of typed A/4 folios 
 
[Hungarian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 004414/1989, 2062/MT. Strictly Secret! Prepared in 
59 copies. Copy No. 00056. 
 
Report to the [Hungarian] Council of Ministers on the Warsaw Treaty [WT] country leaders’ 
conference. 
 
On December 4, 1989, at Soviet initiative, the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in 
Moscow. On the conference, which was called in order to give information on Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s visit to Italy and the Vatican, as well as on his talks with the American President 
George Bush, the participants of the conference from Hungary were Rezső Nyers, president of 
the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and Prime Minister Miklós Németh. (See list of 
participants in the attachment.) 
 
In his introduction, M. Gorbachev attached great significance to the meeting in Moscow 
which in his evaluation demonstrated the strengthening of the alliance connections [as well 
as] the continuity of the cooperation among the WT countries. He stressed the necessity of 
making [mutual] contacts on different levels inside the [Warsaw Treaty] alliance system even 
more frequent. He was expounding that amid the changes that had ensued in our countries, 
mutual exchange of information and thus avoiding misunderstanding is even more 
indispensable. Referring to the experiences of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, 
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he pointed out that the dilatory political reactions to the new developements in certain cases 
led to such extraordinary situations that handling the [political] processes became difficult or 
even impossible.  
 
Regarding his negotiations in Italy, M. Gorbachev spoke highly of Italy’s constructive role in 
Europe, and also of the fact that this country was among the first appearing on the Soviet 
market with significant economic projects. Assessing his present talks as a success beyond all 
expectations, M. Gorbachev emphasized the utilization of military capacities for civil 
purposes [e.g. making the military sector produce consumer goods], the fight against drug 
addiction and environmental protection as [three] fields that offer themselves as new 
[prospective] cooperation possibilities. At the same time he mentioned that on the Italian side 
the slow tempo of the Soviet economic transformation and bureaucracy are seen as the [two] 
biggest obstacles in the [way of] expanding wide-ranging cooperation. He drew attention to 
the operational experiences of the [Italian] state sector which plays a significant role in the 
Italian economy, and thus it could be utilized in our countries too. 
 
Speaking about his unusually long, [and] substantive talks with Pope John Paul II, M. 
Gorbachev stressed that the favorable [and] constructive atmosphere of the negotiations was a 
result of a long, multi-step preparation process. He put a great value to the Pope’s work 
promoting cooperation for the sake of peace as well as view on the relationship of politics and 
ethics, which is very near to the Soviet thinking which is based on the primacy of universal 
human values. He emphasized: Pope John Paul II is supporting both perestroika and in 
general the changes taking place in Eastern Europe, [but] he does not identify himself in any 
way with any ambitions aiming at the destabilization of the region. According to the 
information from the Soviet leader, as the first step toward normalization of relations between 
the Soviet Union and the Vatican, they will mutually send to each other permanent 
representatives whose function will be specified later.  
 
At the same time the Pope was given an assurance that the situation of the Catholics [living] 
in the Soviet Union will be resolved within the framework of the general transformation of 
society, [and also] on the [legal] grounds of the forthcoming laws on freedom of conscience 
and religion. The Soviet side proposed direct negotiations in order to solve the open questions 
between the Greek Catholics and Pravoslavs and it promised to respect any agreement that 
48 
 
would be the result of these negotiations. The Pope accepted an invitation to the Soviet 
Union; the date of which will be set depending on further developments. 
 
Within the scope of detailed information given about the Soviet–American summit on Malta, 
M. Gorbachev – beyond the information that has already become public – made the following 
noteworthy statements: 
 
In Bush’s initiative [to meet] probably an important part was played by the pressure that had 
been put on him by the West European allies and significant American circles, according to 
whom the US administration is in a significant delay regarding the assessment of the 
European processes and the genuine reaction to them. The [American] proposal was 
welcomed positively from the Soviet side because on the one hand it is in their interest to 
continue the Soviet–American dialogue, [and] to support President Bush, on the other hand 
the meeting offered a good opportunity to get acquainted with the views of the new 
administration as well as to expound on Soviet expectations. Talks were open and 
constructive from start to finish. Bush – unlike his predecessor – did not try to give his partner 
a lecture. According to Soviet assessment, the present American President is prudent, cautious 
in his decisions, and this is indispensably a positive feature amid the present circumstances 
when any hurried steps could have very serious consequences. 
 
Regarding talks on Soviet–American economic relations at the summit, M. Gorbachev’s 
information was rather reticent. Without mentioning concrete issues, he mentioned only this: 
there was agreement about the opportunity for moving on [with the economy], however, 
political incentives [to influence US] business circles are necessary. He emphasized that the 
American government is ready to handle both the participation of the Soviet Union in the 
international economic and financial institutions as well as the question of granting it most 
favored nation status in a new way. 
 
M. Gorbachev described the debate on the security, [and] political-military questions as very 
constructive, despite the fact that significant difference of standpoints in many important 
questions will continue. In his opinion, there are favorable prospects for holding an European 
summit in 1990. During the negotiations a concord was generally felt in that respect that a 
newer political impulse is needed for surmounting the difficulties, nevertheless the clearing-
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up of the details was postponed by the two sides to the meetings of foreign ministers planned 
for January, further on scheduled for March, April and May [of 1990]. The difference of 
views seems to be particularly sharp on the question of the naval bases and on the arms 
deployed at sea [tactical nuclear forces at sea]. Regarding the latter – according to Soviet 
judgment – the move [to do away with all nuclear forces at sea] is conceivable on the basis of 
the [Sergey] Akhromeyev formula according to which basically all nuclear arms belonging to 
this category should be eliminated. The opinions drew slightly near in the question of [the ban 
of] chemical weapons, inasmuch as [the two sides] came to an agreement to solve the problem 
on a global scale, specifically regarding the possibility of proportional realization of this aim. 
It is worth mentioning at the same time that the Soviet side regards the adherence of the 
American side to the 2% final security [strategic] stock [of chemical weapons] as 
incompatible with the globality [of the aim]. Each side set great value to the so called Open 
Skies initiative, at the same time the Soviets pressed for further development of this proposal, 
[and they pressed for] its extension to land, sea and space. 
 
Among the regional conflicts, most attention was given to the crisis in Central America. 
According to Soviet assessment, the United States represents an aggressive standpoint in this 
question without reason, and has prejudices towards Nicaragua. Beside this the American side 
– regarding Soviet steps [that have been] done so far as insufficient – urges energetic Soviet 
pressure [on Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega] in order to change the policy of the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan leaders, and specifically in order to put a stop to the weapon deliveries [shipping 
arms] to [San] Salvador. According to M. Gorbachev’s qualification, contrasts [in this 
question] seem antagonistic so far. 
 
In connection with the question of Afghanistan, the Soviet side was offended by [the fact] that 
the United States is still raising unacceptable conditions against the efforts to create a 
coalitional government, [while] leaving out of consideration an earlier Soviet–American 
agreement that they would treat the problem of Afghanistan as an example of wrapping up 
crisis centers with political tools. Whereas both sides acknowledged its partner’s efforts for 
searching for possibilities of settling the Middle East crisis and both of them appreciated the 
role of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. The Soviet side indicated: according to 
their view, the PLO has reached the limit of its possibilities, [and] the United States should 
put pressure on Israel in the interest of the compromises that are still needed. Reflecting upon 
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an American issue, M. Gorbachev stated that from their side there are no principal obstacles 
in [the way of the] normalization of the Soviet–Israeli relations [to reestablish diplomatic 
relation broken off in 1967], and he reinforced that they are ready for opening consulates 
mutually. 
 
During the debate over the evaluation of the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
– according to the information – G. Bush from first to last pressed for a pragmatic approach of 
specific questions, giving an impression that he was consciously avoiding a deep and genuine 
exchange of views. In spite of this, at the meeting M. Gorbachev expressed in details: these 
changes have to be assessed and handled in the context of the changes experienced generally 
in the world. He stressed that the West has to change too because the further application of the 
methods of the Cold War, [or] presentation of positive changes as a superiority of policy of 
force can have very serious consequences. Present-day changes, [and] the need for ending 
Europe’s division are objective demands. It is, however, unacceptable to achieve unity 
through the abolition of socialism, [and it is similarly unacceptable to achieve it] exclusively 
on the basis of Western values, [as well as] to replace the Brezhnev doctrine with a certain 
Bush doctrine. Peoples’ right to independent development [to make their own choices] has to 
be fully respected everywhere. 
 
The American President stressed the stabilization role of the political-military alliance 
systems, at the same time he accepted that some essential modifications in the character of 
alliances in order to increase their openness, [and] their willingness to cooperate is [indeed] 
needed. Both sides have agreed – and according to M. Gorbachev’s assessment other NATO 
country leaders are of the same opinion – that the question of the abolition of military blocks, 
proposed by the WT [Warsaw Treaty], should not been handled hastily, emotionally, [and] 
one-sidedly. Similarly, withdrawal of the foreign troops stationing abroad [military personnel 
deployed on foreign territory] has to be dealt with prudently. 
 
Regarding the German question, President Bush reaffirmed the principle of inviolability of the 
[state] borders, and the fact of the existence of two German states, but according to Soviet 
assessment at the summit no unambiguous American standpoint was outlined regarding this 
matter. M. Gorbachev at the same time resolutely refused [Helmut] Kohl’s confederation plan, 
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which – in his opinion – was proposed by the West German chancellor obviously from [pre-
]electoral considerations. 
 
President Bush unambiguously reinforced America’s support for the Soviet perestroika, at the 
same time – according to the information – he concentrated his message basically on two 
topics: on the propagation of the advantages of private property, and on securing a peaceful 
framework for the promising developments in the Baltics and in the southern [Soviet] 
republics. The Soviet side stated that they regard the degree of economic independence of the 
producers as the key question over the form of property, whereas in the second issue [of the 
Baltics and the southern Soviet republics] they expect the United States to use the same 
standard regardless of where the problems specifically occur. 
 
During the short remarks after the briefing [the following was heard:] 
 
The word was first given to P. Mladenov who just praised the quick information, and spoke 
about the significance of reinforcing the cooperation; 
 
Rezső Nyers urged the earliest possible reform of the WP, specifically he pressed for rejecting 
foregoing unviable methods of Comecon, and for forming fundamentally new forms of 
cooperation. 
 
H. Modrow practically dealt only with the topic of German reunification – which in his 
wording has already appeared as a slogan in the GDR. He described the American standpoint 
regarding the two German states as controversial, and he stated that even from the Kohl Plan 
they can only accept the first four points which concern the reinforcement of contractual 
relations. 
 
W. Jaruzelski also stressed the proper handling of the German question, [and stressed] the 
necessity of forming a united standpoint in this issue, because this problem – as he said: also 
because of the question of [state] borders – is of great importance for them. Beside this he 
urged the modernization, [and] reinforcement of cooperation within Comecon arguing that 
thus the organization would increase our influence, and would provide a reliable background 
for our international actions. 
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N. Ceausescu once again stressed the negative tendencies aggravating the international 
situation. He emphasized that the anti-communism of the Western countries has gained a new 
strength, and its effect can be sensed particularly in the countries which were liquidating 
socialism.  
He specified the campaigns for discrediting certain [communist] countries and their leaders as 
meaningless.  
 
He repeated his initiative for summoning a high-level conference in order to discuss some 
questions concerning the development of socialism and the peace policy in this very year, and 
he stated that Romania – yielding to the pressure of numerous countries – is even ready to 
host an international conference of the communist and workers’ parties. 
 
K. Urbanek stated as the most direct goal the creation of a humane, [and] democratic 
socialism in Czechoslovakia. 
x x x 
 
The participants of the conference (except for the Romanian delegation which was not 
directly involved in this issue) adopted a short joint declaration condemning the 
Czechoslovakian action [military intervention] of the WT in 1968. 
 
An agreement, put forward by Bulgaria, was settled that the next-in-line council meeting of 
the Comecon would be held in Sophia on January 9–10, 1990.  
 
Budapest, December 6, 1989 
 
The list of names of the delegations participating in the conference in Moscow December 4, 
1989 
 
Bulgaria: 
Petar [Toshev] Mladenov, Secretary General of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], 
President of the State Council [Head of State] 
Georgi Atanasov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Prime Minister] 
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Dimiter Stanisev, Secretary of the CC [Central Committee] 
Bojko Dimitrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Czechoslovakia:  
Karel Urbánek, Secretary General of the CPC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] 
Ladislav Adamec, President of the Federal Government 
Ondrej Saling, Secretary of the CC [Central Committee] 
Jaromir Johannes, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Poland: 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, President of the Republic [of Poland] 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Prime Minister] 
Mieczyslav Rakowski, First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP [Central Committee of the 
Polish United Workers’ Party] 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Hungary: 
Nyers Rezső, President of MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] 
Németh Miklós, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Prime Minister] 
Somogyi Ferenc, Under Secretary of the [Hungarian Ministry of] Foreign Affairs 
 
GDR: 
Egon Krenz, President of the State Council [Head of State] 
Hans Modrow, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Prime Minister] 
Oscar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Romania: 
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the State Council [Head of State], Secretary General of the 
RCP [Romanian Communist Party] 
Constantin Dascalescu, Prime Minister 
Constantin Olteanu, Secretary of the CC [Central Committee] 
 
The Soviet Union: 
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Mikhail [Sergeyevich] Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 
Secretary General of the CPSU CC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union] 
Nikolai [Ivanovich] Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Prime Minister] 
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Alexsander [Nikolaevich] Yakovlev, Secretary of the CC [Central Committee; Chairman, 
International Committee] 
 
(Obtained by Béla Révész. English translation by Barnabás Vajda, Laura Deal and Karl P. 
Benziger. Edited by Barnabás Vajda) 
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II/2. Telegram of the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about V. M. Falin’s 
[Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU] briefing about the Malta meeting from December 11, 1989  
 
Edited English Transcription, with omissions in the original document marked as: (…) 
 
Original source: A moszkvai magyar nagykövetség távirata Valentin M. Falinnak a máltai 
találkozóról adott tájákoztatójáról. 1989. december 11. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos 
Levéltára, MNL OL, MOL XIX-J-1-j 1989 Szovjetunió 2-00831/3. Author of the source: 
unknown. 
 
Telegram sent by the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow about information presented by 
Valentin M. Falin on December 11, 1989 about the meeting at Malta. Department of 
Telecommunications of MFA [Ministry of Hungarian Foreign Affairs] Embassy: Moscow. 
“Top secret.” 
 
On December 11 [1989], V.[alentin] M. Falin, the Head of the International Department of 
the CPSU CC, USSR, gave information to the leaders of the socialist countries in Moscow on 
the summit at Malta. They [the Soviet leaders] decided to provide new information, as he 
said, because on the one hand there are still things that have not become public, on the other 
hand in the US some ideas have been presented tendentiously or even wrongly. 
 
While reconsidering the values that have been valid until now, some unpleasant things came 
to light for the first time from the US, and some doubts have arisen in regard to if [the US] is 
capable of handling the problems raised by the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, Japan, 
and Western Europe, at a time when a devaluation of [the United States’] power is in progress 
in international politics. The US has had considerable internal economic difficulties, the 
national debt is huge, and it is starting to fall behind in some areas of technological and 
scientific advancement too. 
 
[George] Bush’s team considered it important and useful [to hold] a working-style exchange 
of views with the Soviet Union in order to reinforce their own positions and conclusions, and 
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to end those foreign-policy-related discussions which interrupted diplomatic activities, or 
even brought into question the efficient operation of the whole [American] administration. 
Although Bush is a liberal, non-aggressive, and balanced politician, if he could act freely he 
would fully exploit difficulties that perestroika inevitably entails. The situation, however, is 
that the US itself is awaiting a perestroika, the US cannot live in an old way anymore. The 
two biggest victims of the Cold War are the Soviet Union and the US. The national debt of an 
astronomical size is the price of America’s world power ambitions, because they want to be 
the hegemons of the world. 
 
The actual [American] government, to all appearances, has realized that it is not possible to 
make policy in the old way [any more]. This has become apparent already during the first 
talks of the two leaders at the Malta summit. Bush did not start to lecture the Soviet Union but 
he stated that the containment policy, which made the two countries adversaries and enemies, 
has to be supplanted. It had been typical of the atmosphere of the negotiations that the United 
States did not try to make [the USSR] feel its ‘superpower-number-one’ position any more, 
and approached the role of both great powers in a more balanced way [than before]. This has 
been a very significant positive difference in comparison with the previous summits. (…) 
 
(…) Bush stated that the US does not want to disturb either perestroika or the analogue 
processes which are underway in Eastern Europe. [Bush] is interested in the success of 
perestroika. Gorbachev reflected upon this that if the position of the [US] administration were 
different, then it would get into conflict with the tenor of American society and public 
opinion. (…) 
 
(…) Therefore at the Malta summit political-military questions were put in a central position. 
Serious, in some places rigorous, but constructive debate had taken place. Although the 
Americans did not agree with quite a lot of the questions raised by the Soviets, but they did 
not refuse them >>out of hand<< either, but held up the prospect that they would examine the 
Soviet arguments, conclusions and anxieties. (…) 
 
(…) Gorbachev and Bush have agreed to sign an agreement in 1990 at the highest level on the 
reduction of conventional weaponry. At the same time Gorbachev proposed that they hold 
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Helsinki II. Bush [however] did not commit himself to Helsinki II. (According to Falin, 
[Giulio] Andreotti and [Francois] Mitterand are more inclined toward this.) (…) 
 
(…) According to Gorbachev’s assessment, the American government has not yet taken up an 
exact policy line for the post-Cold War era. There is a big temptation to exploit the severe 
changes that have been taking place in the GDR to coax one-sided and “unbalanced” 
concessions out of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. He even made a remark to 
Bush that instead of the already nonexistent Brezhnev doctrine some speak of a Bush 
doctrine. The components of the theoretical policy of the Soviet Union are freedom of choice, 
[and] non-interference into [others] internal policy. Along with this, and strictly complying 
with these principles, [the USSR] encourages political changes which aim at reinforcing 
democracy and the power of the people. 
 
Bush stated that the US is faithful to the Helsinki process as well as to its principles. 
According to Falin, although this is quite a significant statement, it is quite general too. 
 
Regarding the questions of German reunification, Bush’s inner limits and interests became 
visible. It is very important that he gave a balanced evaluation of the situation. On the one 
hand the United States sympathizes with the profound changes which are reshaping the social 
structure of Eastern Europe, on the other hand [however] it is not interested in destabilizing 
the European situation. It is important to the Americans that the existence of such 
organizations of European stability as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty should not be 
questioned. The United States thus does not want to force German reunification, and the 
President does not intend >>to dance on the Berlin wall<<10. According to Bush, the West 
European allies [of the US] take the same position. They oppose establishing a strong, united 
Germany because nobody can guarantee what policy it would pursue. 
 
Both sides agreed that the confederation proposed by [Helmut] Kohl is merely a slogan at the 
moment, [and] the necessary conditions for [its] realization have not been given. A 
confederation, for instance, would presume a joint military policy. The Soviet Union would 
not agree to a NATO-member Germany and the West would not agree to let it join the 
                                                 
10
 “Jumping up and down at the wall” as G. Bush literally said at the Malta meeting. 
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Warsaw Treaty. Achieving the neutrality of Germany would be improbable too. Falin 
separately emphasized that such mutually close approaches were expressed during the joint 
press conference [at Malta] which had not been imaginable earlier. 
 
The Soviet side raised the question of the modernization of military doctrines too. The WT 
[Warsaw Treaty] has already changed its own [doctrine] based on the concept of sufficient 
defense, and its structure is undergoing some changes too. The US and NATO, however, for 
20 years has been based on [the principle of] >>rapid response<< [i.e. flexible response] which 
earmarks the use of nuclear weapons on the fifth day [of hostilities]. The time has come for 
the Westerners too, to change this. (…) 
 
(…) Gorbachev objected that on the American side [some actors] actively interfere with the 
internal policy of the Soviet Union. Some American senators travel around and make 
promises in the Baltics, and some American lawmakers are dealing with Karabakh too. He 
asked why they don’t give advice to Canada (Quebec) and England (Ulster) instead. Bush 
pondered upon this and expressed that the administration does not share the opinion of 
Congress, and [that] on the Soviet side these manifestations should not been viewed as 
official, unfriendly gestures. (…) 
 
(…) Falin assessed that the Malta summit means a new boundary, the Cold War has 
essentially been ending, and [that] the pre-conditions are now set for forming a new level and 
higher quality of international relations. 
 
 
(Obtained by Béla Révész. English translation by Barnabás Vajda, Laura Deal and Karl P. 
Benziger. Edited by Barnabás Vajda) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
